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Abstract
We investigate geoengineering as a possible substitute for adaptation and mitiga-
tion measures to address climate change. With the help of an integrated assessment
model, we distinguish between the effects of solar radiation management on at-
mospheric temperature levels and its side-effects on ecosystems. To address the
uncertainty regarding the magnitude of side-effects, we rely on a distributional anal-
ysis. Our results indicate that mitigation is the preferred strategy, with adaptation
acting as an effective complement. As geoengineering brings significant side-effects
on the environment, it is used in only a few of the analyzed scenarios. We then dis-
cuss additional concerns with geoengineering, and analyze their impacts on policy
choices. In particular, we account for the possibility to make wrong assumptions
about side-effects.
Keywords: Climate change; Climate policy mix; Adaptation; Mitigation; Geoengi-
neering
1 Introduction
Despite international initiatives to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, atmospheric
concentrations keep increasing. In this context, alternatives (or complements) to the
traditional mitigation approach are considered. The first such strategy is adaptation.
It covers a large array of sectors and options, and can be ‘proactive’ or ‘reactive’. De-
spite having gained attention for its advantages, investments in adaptation remain quite
limited.
Given the increasing risk of an unmanageable temperature path, some scientists are
advocating a second alternative to mitigation, namely geoengineering solutions. They
∗olivier.bahn@hec.ca
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correspond to deliberate modifications of the climate system in order to alleviate cli-
mate change impacts (Keith, 2000). One may distinguish between two main techniques,
namely Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and Solar Radiation Management (SRM).
In this paper, we focus on a SRM approach that targets the reduction of incoming
solar radiation by injection of sulfur in the stratosphere, believed to be one of the most
efficient geoengineering strategies to reduce global temperature (Wigley, 2006; Shepherd
et al., 2009). Its premise is the ability to keep temperature levels artificially low, instead
of reducing GHG emissions. In case of abrupt climate changes, with rare but catastrophic
impacts, SRM could act as a quick and effective temperature ‘backstop’ (Barrett, 2008),
while adaptation and mitigation measures could have only limited effectiveness.
However, SRM brings along important risks, as it may produce unintended conse-
quences and harmful side effects (Victor, 2008). Injecting sulfur particles into the upper
atmosphere is expected to cause ozone depletion (Crutzen, 2006; Tilmes et al., 2008),
alter ecosystems (Stanhill and Cohen, 2001), and trigger regional imbalances (e.g., in
the patterns of surface temperature, radiation, and the water cycle; Bala et al., 2008;
Niemeier et al., 2013; Kravitz et al., 2013; Schaller et al., 2013). Furthermore, SRM
achieves only an ‘artificial’ reduction in temperature levels. With a continued increase
in concentrations, the injection of aerosols would need to raise proportionally, and a
disruption would lead to a significant jump in temperatures at the corresponding con-
centration level (Brasseur and Roeckner, 2005; Lenton and Vaughan, 2009; Vaughan and
Lenton, 2012) with probable dire consequences.
Given these important caveats, support for geoengineering measures has been incon-
clusive so far. Assuming low side-effects, Crutzen (2006), Wigley (2006), and Carlin
(2007) recommend this strategy, but with a strong warning. Mitigation emerges then
as the safe and ethical solution, while geoengineering should be backed by additional
research. Recent studies focus on modeling decision-making in the context of multiple
sources of risk. Gramstad and Tjotta (2010) propose an integrated assessment model
(IAM) that allows for parametric uncertainty in the impact of sulfur dissipation on ra-
diative forcing. They find that SRM passes the cost-benefit test under all scenarios,
but admit that other factors (such as the risk of SRM interruptions) could lead to the
rejection of such projects. Using a different IAM, Goes et al. (2011) account for the
failure to sustain aerosol forcing and for the subsequent unraveling of drastic climate
changes. In such a case, SRM is found to be an economically inefficient strategy.
In this paper, we contribute to the geoengineering debate with the Ada-BaHaMa
integrated assessment model (Bahn et al., 2012), enriched to explicitly consider a SRM
strategy. We distinguish between the different effects of SRM on atmospheric temper-
ature levels and ecosystems. While the desired effects of SRM on radiative forcing can
be estimated with a significant degree of confidence (Crutzen, 2006), the undesired side-
effects of sulfur dissipation represent a large and important unknown. We focus on this
second uncertainty source, and use a distributional analysis based on a binomial tree
representation of possible evolutions of side-effects over time. Our original contribution
consists in assessing, within an integrated assessment framework, the optimal policy
mix when different strategies are available (mitigation, proactive and reactive adapta-
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tion, and SRM) while accounting for the downside risks of SRM.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details our dynamic
IAM, whose calibration is presented in Section 2.2. Sections 3 and 4 provide numerical
results and analyze specific uncertainties related to SRM. Section 5 concludes.
2 Modeling approach
2.1 Overview
In this section we briefly review the original Ada-BaHaMa model (Bahn et al., 2012) and
detail the new modeling features: i) the introduction of SRM as an instrument to control
temperature increase and ii) a separate accounting of proactive and reactive adaptation.
The Ada-BaHaMa model distinguishes between two types of economy: a ‘carbon’
economy (our present economy), where production is fossil fuel intensive, and a ‘low-
carbon’ economy with small GHG contributions. More precisely, production (Y ) occurs
in the two economies according to an extended Cobb-Douglas function in three inputs:
capital (K), labor (L), and energy (measured through GHG emissions E). Capital
stock in each economy evolves according to the choice of investment (I) and a standard
depreciation relation. Total labor (L) is divided between the two economies.
2.1.1 Climate dynamics in presence of SRM
GHG stocks evolve according to the dynamic equations of the DICE model (Nordhaus,
2008) that distinguishes between three reservoirs: i) an atmospheric one (MAT ), ii) a
quickly mixing one in the upper oceans and the biosphere (MUP ), and iii) a slowly
mixing deep-ocean reservoir (MLO) which acts as a long-term sink.
We extend the original Ada-BaHaMa to account for a geoengineering strategy that
increases the albedo effect through sulfur injection in the stratosphere (SRM). This
directly affects the relationship between the accumulation of GHGs and the temperature
deviation, by reducing the radiative forcing F (t, s):
F (t, s) = ηlog2
(
MAT (t, s)
MAT (1750)
)
+ FEX(t) − ωG(t, s) (1)
where η is a calibration parameter for a climate sensitivity of 3◦C, FEX the exogenous
radiative forcing term, ω the effectiveness factor of SRM, and G the amount of sulfur
injected in the stratosphere measured in teragrams of sulfur (Tg S). The index s identifies
the specific ‘side-effects’ scenario that describes the evolution of the damage level from
the uncertain SRM strategy.
The other elements of the climatic model remain unchanged from Ada-BaHaMa and
follow the DICE model to compute the earth’s mean surface temperature (TAT ) and the
average temperature of the deep oceans (TLO).
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2.1.2 Climate change damages and SRM side-effects
Ada-BaHaMa follows the approach used in MERGE (Manne and Richels, 2005) to link
climate change damages and their economic impacts. Here, we additionally account for
negative externalities from sulfur injection. According to Ramanathan et al. (2001) and
Brovkin et al. (2009), dissipating large amounts of sulfur in the upper atmosphere may
have potentially disruptive effects on weather patterns and the water cycle. Additional
damages are expected in case sulfur particles enter the troposphere and add to the sulfur
concentration in soil (Crutzen, 2006). Nevertheless, the exact type and magnitude of
side-effects remain unknown, and our modeling is not immune to these uncertainties.
We model the magnitude of SRM negative side-effects (DGE) based on: i) the amount
of sulfur used relative to the natural stock of sulfur observed in the stratosphere in 1750,
and ii) a stochastic factor quantifying in economic terms the possible side-effects. The
damages persist over time and exhibit the following dynamics:
DGE(t+ 1, s) = δDGE(t, s) + αGE(t+ 1, s)
G(t+ 1, s)
SGnat
(2)
where δ (< 1) is a constant depreciation rate, SGnat the natural (1750) concentration
level of sulfur in the upper atmosphere, and αGE a time-varying random process. Each
state s describes a different and unique path taken by αGE(t, s) between t = 0 and t = T
(the model horizon). In total, more than 32,000 different paths were used to construct
the distribution of the SRM damages; see Section 2.2. Note that Eq. (2) accounts only
for ‘direct’ effects in the same time period (such as changes in the water cycle). ‘Indirect’
effects (such as ocean acidification) are addressed in Section 4.
The temperature increase (TAT ) entails damages that can be alleviated through adap-
tation (AD). They impact the production function together with SRM side-effects. We
model the total economic loss factor (ELF) as follows:
ELF(t, s) = 1 −
(
AD(t, s)
(
TAT (t, s) − Td
catT − Td
)2
+DGE(t, s)
)
(3)
where Td is the temperature deviation (from pre-industrial level) at which damages start
to occur, while catT represents the ‘catastrophic’ temperature level at which the entire
production would be wiped out. To have a comparable basis with the current literature
on IAM with adaptation, Td and catT are calibrated to replicate the damage intensity
in DICE; see Section 2.2.
2.1.3 Proactive and reactive adaptation
Recent IAM models (Bosello et al., 2010; Agrawala et al., 2011) include both reactive
and proactive adaptation in the available policy mix. Acknowledging the increased flexi-
bility of considering both strategies, we distinguish between reactive (flow) and proactive
(stock) adaptation. We model the effectiveness of the two adaptation strategies in re-
ducing climate change damages as follows:
AD(t, s) = 1 − αADp(t, s)
K3(t, s)
K3max(t)
− αADr(t, s)
S3(t, s)
S3max(t)
(4)
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where αADp (respectively, αADr) is the maximum proactive (resp. reactive) adaptation
effectiveness, K3 (resp. S3) the amount of proactive adaptation capital (resp. reactive
adaptation spending), K3max (resp. S3max)
1 the maximum amount of adaptation capital
(resp. spending) that would ensure the optimal effectiveness of the proactive (resp.
reactive) adaptation measures. Like K3max in our original model, S3max is modelled as
an increasing function of the temperature level:
S3max(t) = βADr
(
TAT (t)
Td
)γADr
(5)
where βADr and γADr are calibration parameters; see Section 2.2.
The two options are assumed to be complementary, in that the implementation of
one enhances the effectiveness of the other. This can be justified as follows. On the
one hand, reactive adaptation may require the existence of pre-existing (adaptation)
infrastructure. On the other hand, it may be used to adjust long-lasting adaptation
infrastructure to the newly observed damages. Adaptation effectiveness is modelled as
follows:
αADp(t, s) = (αADp − αADp)
(
γ1
K3(t, s)
K3max(t)
+ γ2
S3(t, s)
S3max(t)
)
+ αADp (6)
αADr(t, s) = (αADr − αADr)
(
γ1
S3(t, s)
S3max(t)
+ γ2
K3(t, s)
K3max(t)
)
+ αADr (7)
where αADp and αADp (resp., αADr and αADr) are the minimum and maximum effective-
ness values for proactive (resp., reactive) adaptation, and γ1, γ2 calibration parameters
(γ1 > γ2, γ1 + γ2 = 1). We model adaptation effectiveness such that in particular: i)
the absence of one adaptation strategy does not make the other ineffective, but reduces
its potential; and ii) only maximum capital level (K3(t, s) = K3max(t)) and spending
(S3(t, s) = S3max(t)) ensure maximum effectiveness.
2.1.4 Welfare maximization
As with the original Ada-BaHaMa model, we maximize social welfare (W ) given by the
sum over T 10-year periods of a discounted utility from per capita consumption. This
maximization is done independently for each state s, corresponding to a certain evolution
of SRM side-effects. Consumption comes from an optimized share of production, the
remaining being used: i) to invest in the production capital of the carbon and low-carbon
economies (I1, I2) and in the proactive adaptation capital (I3); ii) to spend for reactive
adaptation (S3) and SRM measures (S4); and iii) to pay for energy costs. The presence
of damages (defined by the ELF factor) reduces the available production such that:
ELF(t, s)Y (t, s) = C(t, s) + I1(t, s) + I2(t, s) + I3(t, s) + S3(t, s) + S4(t, s)
+pE1(t, s)φ1(t, s)E1(t, s) + pE2(t, s)φ2(t, s)E2(t, s) (8)
1We impose at all time periods K3(t, s) ≤ K3max(t) and S3(t, s) ≤ S3max(t).
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2.2 Calibration
The economy and climate modules are calibrated on the 2007 version of DICE, hereafter
DICE20072. We calibrate a baseline scenario—in which only the carbon economy is
producing—to match as closely as possible production, concentration, and temperature
trajectories of the DICE2007 baseline. Production in the low-carbon economy is more
energy efficient, but also more costly, than in the carbon economy. Without distinguish-
ing among specific technologies, we rely on the MERGE model (Manne and Richels,
2005) for its calibration.
Calibration of the adaptation strategies follows the AD-DICE approach (de Bruin
et al., 2009), accounting for the additional reactive adaptation option and its comple-
mentarity with proactive adaptation. The calibration of K3max and S3max relies on
World Bank estimates (Margulis and Narain, 2009). However, we assume that reactive
adaptation is 50% more costly than proactive adaptation to achieve its maximum po-
tential3. The calibration of the effectiveness parameters αADp and αADr reflects stylized
assumptions about the reactive-proactive relationship. First, we assume that reactive
adaptation is slightly more efficient than proactive adaptation, as ‘last-minute’ strategies
are easier to adjust to observed damages. This assumption is coherent with Agrawala
et al. (2011), where reactive adaptation offsets on average 27% of gross damages and
proactive adaptation only 21%. Our calibration is very close, with 25% for reactive
adaptation (αADr) and 22% for proactive (αADp). Second, the maximum effectiveness
of total adaptation cannot be higher than 0.5. This is coherent with Nordhaus and
Boyer (2000) where total adaptation potential is 0.48 (compared to 0.47 in our calibra-
tion). And third, the difference between minimum and maximum effectiveness for the
two strategies is chosen to be relatively small, which implies that proactive and reactive
adaptation options are only weakly complementary, similar to Agrawala et al. (2011).
The values for the different SRM parameters are derived from Ramanathan et al.
(2001), Crutzen (2006), and Shepherd et al. (2009). For the sulfur effectiveness (ω) we
rely on Crutzen (2006) that reports (from the Mount Pinatubo natural experiment) a
“sulfate climate cooling efficiency of 0.75 W/m2 per Tg S in the stratosphere”. The
lack of scientific evidence regarding possible SRM externalities motivates us to rely on
scenario analysis for side-effects, where many possible paths are considered. To calibrate
αGE , we define three levels of side-effects: an initial level αGE(t0), and two boundary
values for the final period T defining a minimum (αGE) and a maximum level (αGE). To
relate SRM side-effects to climate change damages, we tentatively set αGE(t0) to 0.2523,
such that the injection of 1 Tg S per year during one decade matches the damages from
a temperature increase of one-fourth of the catastrophic temperature deviation (catT ).
Similarly, αGE is set to 1.0366, resulting in side-effects equivalent to damages for 0.5catT .
The uncertainty regarding the evolution of αGE over time is modeled using a binomial
tree approach, with the following dynamics:
2See: http://www.econ.yale.edu/ nordhaus/DICE2007.htm.
3Indeed, deployment of last minute strategies should incur organizational costs much higher than
under a long-planned strategy. Besides, compared to proactive adaptation, reactive adaptation should
bear some of the infrastructure and deployment costs upfront, which induces large overhead.
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αGE(t)
αGE(t+ 1) = (1 + u) · αGE(t) with probability p
αGE(t+ 1) = (1 + d) · αGE(t) with probability (1 − p)
with u the percentage increase, d the percentage decrease, and p the probability of having
an up-move next period. We design a symmetric tree: p = 0.5 and d = −u. Parameter u
is calibrated to link αGE(t0) to αGE in a monotonically increasing path over 15 decades
(until T = 2155): αGE = αGE(t0) · (1 + u)15. Based on the binomial representation we
obtain 32,768 (= 215) different but equiprobable scenarios. This time-varying represen-
tation of SRM side-effects is motivated by the view that ecosystems present dynamic
and non-linear resilience to shocks and perturbations (Holling, 1973; Gunderson, 2003).
Complex socio-ecological systems can have a highly optimized tolerance to a certain set
of disturbances (Carlson and Doyle, 2002; Janssen et al., 2007), but they would suffer
if the disturbances evolve or change outside of their optimized tolerance zone, causing
them to move to new equilibria. Considering the multitude of systems that SRM impacts
and the likely existence of complex feedback loops, we consider its short- and long-term
disturbances to be unpredictable and to evolve in a possibly non-monotonic manner. We
therefore proxy the evolution of ecosystem damages with a binomial tree such that at
each period, the process can evolve to a weaker or stronger state.
3 Optimal policy mix
3.1 Selected scenarios for SRM side-effects
In this section, we consider only three scenarios for SRM side-effects. The first scenario
refers to strong damages, where αGE increases monotonically to αGE . It corresponds to
the upper edge of the distribution (of all possible paths for side-effects) when all fore-
casted impacts would be triggered (ozone depletion, unfavorable change in precipitation
patterns, warming of the tropical tropopause) and the total magnitude would be am-
plified by cross-interactions. The second scenario corresponds to a mild scenario, where
αGE evolves non-monotonically to reach at T a value
4 between αGE and αGE , when
only some of the expected damages occur. The third scenario refers to weak damages,
where αGE decreases monotonically to αGE . It corresponds to the lower edge of the
distribution when sulfur dissipation has almost no side-effects.
In these three scenarios, all policy strategies (mitigation, adaptation, and SRM) are
available. We consider two additional policy scenarios: a mitigation-only scenario (where
adaptation and SRM are not available) and an adaptation-mitigation scenario (where
SRM is not available).
The traditional policy to address climate change is mitigation, which corresponds
in our model to a transition from the carbon economy to the low-carbon one. In the
4Equal to 0.1125, about two times the value of αGE . It has been chosen to get an illustrative scenario
where all the policy options are used.
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mitigation-only scenario, there is a clear transition between the two economies: the
carbon-intensive capital is rapidly phased out after 2055 and completely replaced by the
low-carbon capital by the end of the century. When adaptation is also available as a
policy tool (adaptation-mitigation scenario), this transition does take place, but starts
one decade later. The SRM option has contrasted implications: under mild side-effects,
the transition is further delayed by ten years (after 2075), whereas the transition never
occurs under weak side-effects. In agreement with Barrett (2008), our results indicate
thus that there is no incentive to curb GHG emissions if SRM is available and its side-
effects are benign.
Fig. 1 captures adaptation and SRM decisions. When its side-effects are weak, SRM
is the main instrument to address climate change. It is used after 2055 (substituting
for mitigation efforts), together with adaptation (after 2065). When its side-effects are
mild, SRM is only used (after 2075) as a complement to adaptation and mitigation
strategies. SRM is not used when its side-effects are strong. Concerning adaptation, we
note that: i) the accumulation of proactive adaptation capital starts before spending on
reactive adaptation; and ii) the decreasing trend in adaptation towards the end of the
horizon reflects the lowering of temperature (see Fig. 2) reached through SRM and/or
mitigation.
Figure 1: Capital accumulation in proactive adaptation, and decade spending with re-
active adaptation and SRM
An interesting aspect is the relative dynamics of reactive adaptation and SRM. As
ex-post measures, they share the advantage of rapid implementation and immediate
reduction of damages. The weight given to either measure depends on the magnitude
of sulfur damages: i) in case of strong side-effects, between the two, only adaptation is
used; ii) for mild and weak side-effects, both measures enter the policy portfolio, with
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more weight given to SRM as its side-effects decrease. This results from the limited
effectiveness of reactive adaptation.
Figure 2: Atmospheric temperature and GHG concentrations
Fig. 2 reveals that temperature is kept below the 2 ◦C threshold proposed by the
Copenhagen Accord (except for a brief period) only when SRM side-effects are weak.
This is achieved at the expense of: i) a large deployment of SRM; and ii) high GHG con-
centrations, due to the absence of any mitigation. In the other scenarios, concentrations
and then temperature decrease with the transition to the low-carbon economy.
Imposing the 2 ◦C limit yields an earlier implementation of mitigation and/or SRM.
With strong side-effects, investments in mitigation are advanced by two decades (2035);
with low side-effects, SRM remains predominant and is implemented from 2065 on. To
reduce the lower climate change damages, adaptation is still used with a similar timing
(compared to the unconstrained temperature cases) but requires less funding.
3.2 Distributional analysis for SRM side-effects
In this section, we examine policy decisions for all the side-effect scenarios from the
binomial tree representation; see Section 2.2. Fig. 3 illustrates two historical distributions
of the average5 value of side-effects along each path. The first histogram (in gray)
corresponds to the scenarios where SRM is used, the second (in blue) where it is not.
SRM is not used when side-effects are above a given threshold, here when the average
αGE is above 0.25. This value coincides with the initial side-effect level (αGE(t0)) and
indicates that SRM can only be used at future periods if side-effects become smaller.
For the range [0.18, 0.25] the two histograms overlap, suggesting that the use of SRM
5The average is computed as
∑2155
t=2005 αGE(t, s), for each scenario s ∈ [1, 32768].
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Figure 3: Historical distributions of SRM side-effects
depends not only on the average side-effect value, but also on the minimum value reached
at a given period. SRM is only used in 18.7% of the simulated cases (for at least one
decade), at the earliest in 2065. It starts on average around 2090 and lasts for about 45
years.
In 95% of the cases mitigation is the main policy option. In the remaining 5%,
it is fully substituted by SRM. Besides, SRM acts as a complement to mitigation in
14% of the cases, when mean αGE values are in the [0.16, 0.24] range. Adaptation
is used in all scenarios, with reactive adaptation implemented on average two decades
after proactive. When mitigation is used, adaptation serves mainly to reduce climate
change damages, because of the lag between mitigation implementation and temperature
reduction. Whereas in the presence of SRM, it serves mainly to compensate SRM side-
effects.
4 Indirect and unexpected SRM side-effects
The previous section indicates that SRM should be used when its side-effects are low.
Here, we discuss additional concerns with SRM and analyse the adjustments in the
optimal policy mix.
An important concern with SRM is the potential damage that would be caused by
a failure to sustain the sulfur dissipation (Robock et al., 2009; Goes et al., 2011). We
analyze, in the case of weak side-effects, the consequences of SRM interruption (e.g.,
following a technical breakdown) from 2105. Our results confirm that temperature in-
creases rapidly after the SRM failure, and that the benefits to be gained from mitigation
are then limited due to inertia in the climate system.
Next, our model accounts for direct SRM side effects; see again Eq. (3). But scientists
point also to indirect side-effects such as ocean acidification (Orr et al., 2005). This
arises from high CO2 concentrations in the absence of mitigation. Damages to ocean
ecosystems may occur with CO2 levels as low as 450 ppm (Cao and Caldeira, 2008).
In our distributional analysis, no scenario is consistent with such a level. In particular,
when SRM is used, around 50.3% of the cases reach a level between 550 and 650 ppm,
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the remaining cases are above 650 ppm. When constraining for instance concentration
levels to 550 ppm, the use of SRM is reduced to only 9.5% of all scenarios (compared
with 18.7%).
Finally, the most important concern with SRM is probably that the type and mag-
nitude of side-effects remain largely unknown. Up to now, the optimal policy mix was
evaluated via scenario analysis, assuming that side-effects were known along each sce-
nario. Here, we study the consequences of incurring a different (random) side-effect path
than the one presumed. First, for a given side-effect scenario s, we compute following
Eq. (2) the presumed SRM damages (DGE(t, s)) that translate into GDP losses. Next,
we compute unexpected GDP losses (DGE(t, s
′)) that would arise if a different side-effect
path s′ occurs. More precisely, we replace in Eq. (2) αGE(t, s) with a factor αGE(t, s′)
chosen randomly from the possible side-effect paths, while keeping the same levels for
sulfur injection. Forming wrong assumptions regarding the side-effects should only last
for short periods. Indeed, although the earth system presents some inertia, the magni-
tude of side-effects is ex-post identifiable via decreases in production. However, it might
take several decades until true realizations are identified. As an illustration, we con-
sider an error horizon of one to three decades and compare GDP losses6 under known
(presumed) and random (unexpected) side-effect paths. Fig. 4 reveals that GDP losses
rise when the side-effect path has a different outcome than the one assumed, even on a
ten-year horizon, on average up to two times more across the different scenarios. With
a twenty to thirty-year horizon, GDP losses increase further on average, together with
their variance and right skewness, indicating that extreme losses have a high chance of
occurrence.
Besides estimating welfare losses, we study the adjustments to the optimal policy mix
after observing the true damages. As an example, we examine the (extreme) case where
side-effects were assumed to be weak, but turn out to be strong. With (presumed) weak
side-effects, SRM is first implemented in 2065 at the expense of any mitigation efforts;
see again Section 3. But suppose that after three decades the policy maker realizes
that side-effects are actually strong. We simulate this situation by running the model
from 2065 on with the true αGE values, keeping all investment and spending decisions
blocked for the error horizon (2065-2085). The policy maker reacts by stopping all SRM
activities from 2095 on. A quick transition to the low-carbon economy takes place, but
cannot prevent a temperature increase to almost 3 ◦C. To alleviate some of the climate
damages, adaptation (especially reactive) is also extensively used. Overall, deviating
during the error horizon from the optimal policy in case of strong side-effects results in
lower consumption levels for the remaining horizon.
6For each scenario s ∈ [1, 32768], we compute presumed damages as: ∑tGE+10τt=tGE DGE(t, s), where tGE
is the first period of SRM implementation in scenario s and τ ∈ {1, 2, 3} decades of SRM implementation.
Unexpected damages are computed as: 1
5000
∑5000
i=1
∑tGE+10τ
t=tGE
DGE(t, s
′
i), where αSE(t, s
′
i) is randomly
selected from the initial side-effect distribution over 5000 simulations.
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Figure 4: Distribution of GDP losses under known and random SRM damages for dif-
ferent error horizons
5 Conclusions
This paper extends the Ada-BaHaMa model with an explicit representation of reac-
tive adaptation and geoengineering (SRM). Reactive adaptation complements proactive
adaptation, and its modeling gives a richer representation of possible adaptation strate-
gies. SRM is a potential alternative to traditional climate strategies, and we distinguish
between its effects on temperature levels and its side-effects on ecosystems. To address
the uncertainty regarding the magnitude of side-effects, we use a distributional analysis
based on a binomial tree representation of the evolution of side-effects over time.
We use this new integrated assessment model to analyze the interplay of mitigation,
adaptation, and SRM to address global climate change. Our analysis reveals that miti-
gation is the preferred strategy, with adaptation acting as an effective complement. As
SRM entails serious side-effects on the environment, it is used in only 18.7% of the ana-
lyzed scenarios, with different implementation horizons depending on the severity of the
side-effects. The implementation of SRM measures is done at the expense of mitigation
efforts. At the extreme, under weak side-effects, the transition to a low-carbon economy
does not take place (within the model horizon).
An extensive use of SRM brings additional concerns. One is the potential damage
that would be caused by a failure to continue with sulfur dissipation. Another one
consists in indirect side-effects such as ocean acidification. Since the uncertainty regard-
ing SRM side-effects is currently large, we investigate also possible welfare losses due
to incorrect assumptions about these side-effects. Our analysis shows that GDP losses
rise when the side-effect path has a different outcome than the one presumed. Besides,
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longer error horizons lead to higher GDP losses, together with increased variance and
right skewness, indicating that extreme losses have a higher chance of occurrence.
Our study reinforces the precautionary approach one should have with SRM. Relying
in particular on imperfect forecasts for SRM impacts can lead to large welfare losses, even
for short implementation horizons. In accordance with Moreno-Cruz and Keith (2013),
our findings call thus for the necessity to reduce the uncertainty revolving around SRM
before envisioning a full-scale deployment of this strategy.
In our cost-benefit approach, despite the predominant role of mitigation, we note
that investments in the low-carbon economy start after 2055 at the earliest. However,
when following a cost-effectiveness approach to constrain temperature increase to 2 ◦C,
climate policies are implemented 20 years earlier. Meeting the agreed 2 ◦C temperature
target would thus require earlier actions at the global level.
Our analysis could be improved along the following lines. First, our model assumes
exogenous technological progress. With an endogenous formulation, one might expect
that (R&D) investments in low-carbon technologies start earlier to get ‘on-time’ the
needed technologies for mitigation. Second, being derived in a cost-benefit framework,
our results (and in particular the timing of mitigation) critically depend on the magni-
tude of the estimated climate change damages, calibrated in our model on DICE and
AD-DICE. Recent papers (Stern, 2013; Pindyck, 2013) signal possible underestimations
of climate change damages in the DICE-like integrated assessment models; further re-
search could help address these issues. Third, the deployment of SRM depends on
various unknowns, such as the type and magnitude of side-effects, and the process gov-
erning their variability through time. The calibration of all involved parameters in our
model will benefit from revisions reflecting scientific advances. Finally, our model as-
sumes the existence of a well-functioning international cooperation for the deployment
of SRM at a global level. Future research could improve our understanding of the SRM
option by accounting for differentiated geographical impacts and investigating strategic
country behavior.
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